cockpit remote-access

このReference本文は、アプリが配布するcockpit CLIヘルプと同じ英語の正本から自動生成されています。日本語の概念説明と安全な使い方はcockpit CLIを参照してください。

Manage local Remote Access configuration and runtime together.

cockpit remote-access status [--verbose]
cockpit remote-access configure [--port <1024-65535>] [--scope tailscale|local] [--https true|false] [--keep-awake true|false] [--confirm-local-network]
cockpit remote-access enable [--confirm-local-network]
cockpit remote-access disable --confirm
cockpit remote-access pairing-code [--regenerate]
cockpit remote-access certificate status|generate
cockpit remote-access tailscale status

Configuration is rejected while the server is running. Local-network scope requires --confirm-local-network for both configuration and every enable, and --scope local cannot be combined with --https true: the pair returns constraint_violated because HTTPS depends on a Tailscale certificate. Disabling requires --confirm because it ends every connected session and persists standalone mode, which cannot be undone from a remote device. Enable, pairing-code regeneration, certificate generation, and configuration of an install whose persisted mode is already server force membership verification. Status, disable, certificate status, Tailscale status, and configuration of a standalone install do not.

--keep-awake true keeps the computer awake while Remote Access is running, so a laptop stays reachable after its display turns off. It never blocks display sleep, and it is released when Remote Access stops, when it is set back to false, and when the app quits. status reports the stored value as configured.keepAwake and the live assertion as runtime.keepingAwake. On battery the computer keeps draining while the assertion is held.

Pairing-code regeneration requires Remote Access to be running. Reading the pairing code while it is stopped returns code: null; regeneration instead returns remote_access_not_running so a no-op is never reported as success.

Authentication and membership failures stop a running server and persist standalone mode. A temporarily unavailable membership verifier preserves a running server and its persisted mode. Status never exposes session IDs, tokens, user agents, or authorized token sets.

Cockpit asks Tailscale to print the certificate and private key, then saves that copy in Cockpit's own data on this computer. The copy is private to the user. When HTTPS Remote Access starts and that copy is missing, Cockpit asks Tailscale for it before the server listens, using the same membership check as renewal. Later reads, expiry checks, and certificate renewal all use it, and every renewal writes it again. macOS, Windows, and Linux use this same retrieval, including App Store, Standalone, and Homebrew Tailscale. Cockpit does not read certificate files stored in another app's folders. Logs, errors, diagnostic exports, and command output never include the private key. If access to an older certificate file was denied, get the certificate again. Full Disk Access is not required.

HTTPS certificates are checked when Remote Access starts and every 24 hours while HTTPS is running. A wake from sleep runs an overdue check. Certificates with 30 days or less remaining, including expired certificates, are renewed through Tailscale and applied to the running TLS server. Existing connections remain open; new TLS connections use the renewed certificate. Automatic renewal uses the same membership verification and single in-flight generation as the manual Renew button and CLI. Tailscale controls reissuance timing; no minimum-validity override is used. Failures retry after six hours. Disabling Remote Access stops scheduled checks.

While HTTPS is running, expiry status and warning thresholds use the certificate successfully loaded by the server, even if a newer certificate is on disk after a failed TLS reload. Stopping the server returns expiry status to the file on disk.

certificate status includes expired (true, false, or null when expiry cannot be read), signed daysRemaining (rounded up, so an expired certificate can have zero days), and renewal:

• lastAttempt: null before the first automatic renewal, otherwise {time, outcome, error}. time is the ISO UTC attempt start, outcome is success or failure, and error is a non-secret reason code or null on success.
• nextCheck: ISO UTC scheduled check time, or null while stopped.
• failed: whether the latest renewal/check needs attention; a failed initial fetch is not a renewal failure. A successful manual renewal or a healthy check with no pending TLS reload clears this without overwriting automatic attempt history.
• lastNotifiedAt and notification: the persisted warning time and current-session actionable warning, or null. Automatic renewal failures within 14 days of expiry, including expired certificates, show an in-app warning with Renew. Warnings occur at most once per 24 hours, including across restarts. Successful automatic renewals are silent.

Reason codes distinguish authentication, membership, temporary membership verification, missing Tailscale login/domain, missing Tailscale HTTPS configuration, certificate generation/check failure, and TLS reload failure. Command output, certificate contents, keys, and personal account details are never included in renewal history.